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The Gold Standard During 
the Belle Epoque, 1899-1914 
After the Baring Crisis Argentina endured nine years of adjustments in the 
financial and real sectors and a pronounced deflation. These dislocations were 
painful but appeared necessary to get Argentina back in a position to restore 
external convertibility. Ultimately, convertibility was restored in 1899, and the 
whole experience has long been considered by scholars an archetypal success 
story of a peripheral country finding a way to adopt the reforms necessary to 
establish a credible convertibility commitment for its money. 
This chapter examines the fruits of these efforts and studies Argentina’s ex- 
perience under convertibility from 1899 until the international gold standard 
was suspended by war in 1914. This Belle Epoque was an era of rapid economic 
growth for the country, with large inflows of capital and labor from overseas, an 
expansion of the agricultural frontier, and a surge in trade that built on a com- 
parative advantage in primary products. Under such auspicious circumstances, 
any study of the macroeconomic performance of the money and banking system 
is inevitably rather uneventful, even boring. There were no major crises, and the 
currency board arrangement functioned well in these undoubtedly good times. 
As we shall see, the adjustment mechanisms worked smoothly. 
Unfortunately, the good times were not to last, and the first signs of a major 
downturn emerged in 1913,  when adverse economic conditions in the London 
capital market spilled over to Argentina, The advent of war in 1914 severely 
constrained external markets for capital and goods, plunging Argentina into 
the biggest recession it had ever experienced. It  was in these harder times that 
the rigidity of the currency-board system was to be seen as a distinct drawback, 
even though the system emerged from that recession without having been com- 
promised. Argentina’s reputation for having a firm gold standard commitment 
was further augmented, even at great cost to the domestic economy. Looking 
ahead, it would be the memories of this political-economy tradeoff in the 1910s, 
and of the older 1890s  debate over the deflationary dangers of the gold standard 
regime, that would set the stage for the ultimate test of the monetary system in 
the early 1930s. 
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The  Adoption of Convertibility 
As we have noted, a heated debate had raged in the late 1890s over what kind 
of monetary system would be best in light of the then-current  international 
financial situation.  All points of view could be heard.  During the deflation, 
many had voiced their ardent disapproval of the negative effects of the paper 
peso’s appreciation since 1895.  Others, conversely, had been horrified at the 
prior depreciation and the continued deviation from the old parity. Gesell had 
argued against the damaging effects of deflation on investment and real activity. 
Pellegrini and his followers thought a convertibility plan necessary to eliminate 
“that element of anarchy and destruction-inconvertible  fiduciary money.”’ 
A large sector of the intelligentsia in money and banking circles, including 
highly respected ex-ministers of finance, held a relatively skeptical position as to 
the possibility of imposing convertibility and fixed exchange rates with adequate 
backing in specie. While it eventually became clear that convertibility would be 
the policy objective, this did not settle all of the questions. Doctrinal discussion 
centered on two principal issues. 
First, there was no agreement regarding the legally fixed exchange rate parity 
that should be chosen in order to make convertibility operable. Various ideas 
surfaced, including the possibility of initially converting the paper peso at the 
market parity, and then converging to the old parity over an extended period 
of time during which a “sliding scale” of adjustments in the value of the gold 
premium would be applied?  In the end, the Pellegrini recommendation was 
accepted, with  the  country adopting convertibility at the prevailing market 
exchange rate of 2.27 paper pesos per gold peso? 
Second, reasonable doubts existed over the adequacy of fiscal reforms that 
would assure the credibility of the Conversion Office in its task of exchanging 
paper for specie. The  level of specie reserves was likely to be very low, and it  was 
feared that the mechanism, therefore, could not be maintained in the event of a 
speculative  attack on the paper peso. Despite these concerns, at  the inauguration 
of Congress in 1899,  PresidentJulio A. Roca (1898-1904) declared his intention 
to see convertibility restored as quickly as possible, announcing that 
To achieve that result, we  recommend the formation of a significant specie reserve. One 
of the causes that has most influenced the variation in the value of paper money is the 
lack of confidence in the direction the government is taking.  Convertibility obliges 
us to reorganize and ‘moralize’ the mechanisms of the administration, to introduce all 
1. Moyano Llerena (1935, pp. 48-49). 
2. A minority on the Finance Committee in the lower chamber of Congress had proposed a scale 
of gradual reductions in the gold premium  at a rate of 5 gold cents every six months until 
the old par was reached. It would have taken five and a half years to reach par under such a 
mechanism (Moyano Llerena 1935,pp. 62-63). 
3. Moyano Llerena  (1935) notes the important intellectual and political influence of Senator 
Carlos Pellegrini, the former President,  in the adoption of convertibility in 1899.  On the 
economic thought of Pellegrini, see Gallo (1997). 120  Straining at the Anchor 
the economies possible in the budget, avoiding exaggerated expenditures, reducing or 
eliminating certain taxes, and re-establishing equilibrium in the public finances.  Also 
the provincial governments have  to play their part  in this project.  It is a fact that the 
number of administrative personnel in every province is more than superior to the needs. 
The bulk of those employees who delay the progress of the public administration only 
represent useless and harmful expenses and a burden that must be subtracted from the 
productive work force! 
The Law of Conversion  (Law 3871) was  passed on October  31, 1899, by 
Congress, establishing convertibility promised in  1891.  The Finance Min- 
ister  at the time was Jose Maria Rosa.  From that moment, and for fifteen 
uninterrupted years, Argentina was to maintain gold standard convertibility at 
an exchange rate of 2.27 paper pesos per gold peso.’ 
The first article of the law established a clear and simple monetary regime. 
The Conversion Office would have the singular responsibility of exchanging 
paper for specie (and vice versa) at a rate of exchange fixed by law at 44 gold 
cents for each paper peso. Thus, any expansion or contraction in the amount 
of cash in circulation would exactly match the variations in the level of specie 
reserves on hand at the Conversion Office. With such a system of 100 percent 
marginal gold backing for the currency, there was  a strict and inelastic rela- 
tionship between variations in the stock of metalk reserves and variations in 
the monetary base. Consequently, all  key autonomous monetary policy func- 
tions were proscribed, such as operating on the open market to buy or sell public 
bonds in order to influence the level of interest rates, or the use of rediscounts to 
provide liquidity. In addition, there could not be any other types of guarantees 
offered by  the Conversion Office, such as the provision of Lender-of-Last- 
Resort assistance to the financial system. The  money supply had been rendered 
completely endogenous by this choice of regime. 
Another interesting aspect of the Law of 1899 was the degree of indepen- 
dence from political interference granted to the Conversion Office. The mon- 
etary authority was to be administered by a board of five directors chosen by 
the executive branch, each subject to approval by the Senate, and all appointed 
to a term in office of five years? This was  a clear and transparent  attempt to 
enhance the credibility of the institution by keeping it at arm’s length from the 
various branches of the government that might interfere with or apply pressure 
to the monetary authority as a way to seek fiscal or monetary policy relief in hard 
times.  The plan was successful in this respect, and under these arrangements 
the Conversion Office maintained strict independence from the Executive, the 
4.  Quoted in Fernandez Lopez (1993). 
5. For details of how Finance Minister Rosa coped with the consequences of the law see Rosa 
(1909), and on Rosa’s participation in these debates see Gallo (1977). 
6. According to Moyano Llerena (1935, p. 87)  “the  principal  guarantee ofthe Caja is its separation 
from the Government and, in addition, that its administrators are personally responsible for 
any illegal application of the Caja’s funds.” Calm Before a Storm  121 
treasury, and the Banco de la Naci6n Argentina until the outbreak of the First 
World War in August 1914,  when external convertibility was suspended. 
Obviously, as the skeptics had noted, the most pressing problem facing the 
government was the creation of an initial reserve in specie that could guarantee, 
to some extent at least, the paper in circulation. This was vital in order to sus- 
tain a belief that parity could be defended in the event that the general public 
decided to test the convertibility of its paper pesos into gold. To say that the 
government’s initial position was not very promising would be an understate- 
ment. The level of specie reserves at the Conversion Office throughout the 
period 1891-99 was zero. Originally it had been thought that the Conversion 
Office should have a reserve of approximately 30 million gold pesos, sufficient 
to back almost 25 percent of the monetary base. Article 4 of the Law of Con- 
version sought to generate fiscal revenue for this purpose, but this proved to be 
impossible in the time available, and it was not until 1910 that this goal was 
a~hieved.~  In the end, under the constraints of no fiscal resources, no foreign 
gold loans, and no specie reserve whatsoever-and  in a leap of great faith-the 
law went into effect anyway. This meant that in order to maintain convertibility 
in the early years of the law, it was going to be necessary to generate positive 
net inflows of specie. Otherwise the plan would surely fail. 
The  Gold Standard  Adjustment Mechanism 
For the student of Argentine monetary history, the 1900-1913 gold standard 
period is relatively uneventful in that volatility arising from autonomous fluctu- 
ations in the stock of money and the paper-gold exchange rate were removed as 
independent sources of economic disturbances. The gold standard years were 
noteworthy for a sharp growth in the Argentine real output and the mild infla- 
tion of domestic prices, the latter a reflection of the swift increase in the world 
money supply during the so-called Golden Age of 1902-12.  Key macroeco- 
nomic statistics for this period are shown in Table 6.1. 
The monetary regime proved durable and credible in these years.  From 
November 1899 and until the outbreak of the First World War, the Conversion 
Office stood ready to automatically exchange paper pesos for gold, and vice 
versa, on demand and at a fmed exchange rate of 2.27 paper pesos for each gold 
peso.  The figures in Table 6.1 show that this rule was  strictly obeyed by the 
monetary authorities.  In all years, the increase in the monetary base was fully 
100 percent backed by the inflow of gold reserves at the Conversion Office. By 
adopting and adhering to a very strict gold exchange rule, the Conversion Office 
surrendered its control over the quantity of money, which became endogenously 
determined in the money market. 
7. Moyano Llerena (1935, pp. 85 and 88-90) 122  Straining at the Anchor 
Table 6.1. Monetary and Fiscal Indicators, 1900-1913 
Conversion Office  Money  Domestic  Real  Fiscal Deficit as a 
Monetary  Money  Multi-  Price  Output  Money  Percentage of 
Year  Base  Gold  Supply  plier  Level  Index  Velocity Receipts  GDP 




























































































2.68  5.6  0.7 
2.74  27.7  3.2 
2.30  3.8  0.4 
2.19  3.5  0.4 
2.18  0.0  0.0 
2.36  2.0  0.2 
2.46  1.0  0.1 
2.27  -0.8  -0.1 
2.09  26.5  2.5 
2.13  33.9  3.0 
2.09  33.9  3.1 
2.13  17.6  1.6 
2.29  16.2  1.5 
Notes andsources: Monetary base, gold, and money supply in millions ofpaper pesos. Real output 
index in millions of 1950 pesos. Fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP is estimated as the fiscal 
deficit deflated by wholesale price index divided by the real output index. See Appendix 1. 
How did the market adjust? Starting from a situation of equilibrium in the 
money market the adjustment mechanism operated as follows. An increase in 
domestic real income led to an increased demand for money. This was satisfied 
by an inflow of specie and an increase in foreign reserves at the Conversion 
Office.  This in turn led to an expansion of the monetary base and-via  the 
money multiplier-a  corresponding increase in the broad money supply. Thus, 
in this type of regime, the variable that quickly adjusts to restore equilibrium is 
the domestic money stock. In short, this theory states that gold flows restore 
equilibrium in the money market via an adjustment in the money supply, and 
they have no independent influence on other macroeconomic variables. 
The  key assumptions here are that prices and interest rates are internationally 
determined on world markets via purchasing power parity (PPP) and interest 
parity. Are such assumptions justified? We have already noted that PPP ap- 
peared to hold for Argentina in this period (see Appendix 4).  This result is 
none too surprising given the very high share of foreign trade in output. What 
about international interest arbitrage?  Recall that Argentina became a sub- 
stantial long-term international borrower in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Figure 6.1, which plots the Argentine-European external bond yield 
differential on an annual basis, shows that the required yield to hold an external 
Argentine bond was always higher than the yield of a comparable long-term 
European bond, the Rendita Italiana.  For the entire 1884-13 period, the Ar- Figure 6.1. Bond Spreads, External Bonds, 1883-1913 
-  Spread over British Consol 
-Spread  over Rendita Italiana 
1883  1888  1893  1898  1903  1908  1913 










Figure 6.2. Bond Yields, External and Internal Bonds, 1883-1913 
-  Internal Bond Yield 
-External  Bond Yield 
1883  1888  1893  1898  1903  1908  1913 
Notes undsources: See Appendix 1. 124  Straining at the  Anchor 
gentine long rate was, on average, 2.8 percentage points higher than that of the 
United Kingdom and 1.5 percentage points higher than that of Italy. 
However, the chart also shows remarkable changes in the magnitude  and 
evolution of the spread for the various subperiods of analysis.  For example, 
whenever financial markets perceived that the Argentine government was not 
following prudent fiscal and monetary measures, Argentine debt instruments 
were rated as poor risks, and traded at a big discount, despite the explicit gov- 
ernment guarantee.  From 1889 to 1894, the abrupt rise in the risk spread 
was driven by the Baring Crisis, and the yield “surcharge” on Argentine ex- 
ternal bonds (at least for those that were not in default) amounted to 4 or 5 
percentage points in the London market. 
After 1895,  the fears that Argentina would repudiate its external debt started 
to subside. The external bond spread abruptly declined until 1900, reaching a 
steady low plateau during the gold standard years and continuing with a modest 
declining trend relative to the British consol. Figure 6.2 confirms the fact that 
the abrupt fall in the spread that occurred from 1895 to  1899 was  entirely 
dominated by movements in the yields of the Argentine external bonds. After 
1902  there is a clear convergence  of the domestic bond yield to the external yield. 
When the exchange rate and default risk were minimized, capital markets were 
again closely linked, and the Argentine long-term interest rate was almost equal 
to the long-term rate of the international capital markets. 
If we accept the preliminary evidence in favor of goods and capital market 
arbitrage, a simple test can be conducted to analyze the operation of the gold 
standard in Argentina for the years 1904-13.  The test consists of comparing 
the actual contribution of the inflow of gold to changes in the domestic money 
stock with the residuals of the change in the demand for the money minus the 
changes produced by domestic sources (that  is, changes in the money multiplier). 
Table 6.2 exhibits the results of the test? 
8. The methodology is as follows.  The postulated  money demand takes a standard form  (SCC 
Appendix 4)  where real money balances depend on real income Y and the interest rate i,  with 
ln(Mt/Pt) = a +  dln  Yt + cln(1-t it) +  ut.  The actual rate of change of money supply due 
to foreign sources equals to the rate of change of gold reserves times the backing ratio 
Gr-1  Act  -~ 
MBt-1  Gr-1. 
where G is gold reserves at the Conversion Office, MB is monetary base, and we assume for 
this purpose a fixed money multiplier MIMB. The predicted  rate of change of the money 
supply due to foreign sources is the rate of change in predicted  nominal demand for money 
from the money demand equation minus the rate of change of money supply due to domestic 
sources. The  latter term is calculated as the actual total rate of change of money supply minus 
the actual rate of change of money supply due to foreign sources, namely, 
AMt  Gt-1  AGt 
Mt-1  MBt-1  Gt-1’ 
where M is the stock of money.  See McCloskey and Zecher (1976, pp. 357-85) Calm Before a Storm  125 
Table 6.2. Efects  of  GoldReserves on Money Supply, 1904-13 
Predicted Effect, Using Specification  Actual 
Year  A  B  Change 
1904  5.9  10.9  7.3 
1905  22.6  23.9  22.3 
1906  18.9  8.1  5.7 
1907  0.3  1.0  1.0 
1908  2.4  3.0  9.1 
1909  12.8  13.7  17.8 
1910  1.3  8.4  4.6 
1911  -2.8  -3.4  0.8 
1912  11.1  11.9  10.7 
1913  8.6  9.3  3.0 
Notes andsources: Annual rates of change. Column A uses long-term interest rates in the money 
demand equation; column B uses short-term rates. See text. 
The correlation between predicted and actual reserve flows lends support to 
the monetary theory of the balance of payments as  applied to Argentina for 
this period.  That is, the demand for money in excess of supply provided by 
domestic sources is mainly satisfied by adjustments in gold reserves, a reflection 
of the balance of payments adjustment. 
Money, Prices, and Real Activity under the Gold Standard 
We  have seen how the Argentine economy achieved convertibility, and we also 
examined how the new regime operated. Yet this tells us little about the more 
important  end result of any policy reform package: what it meant for broad long- 
term economic achievement,  How well did the Argentine economy perform 
under the new gold standard regime? To answer that question, we now briefly 
review some of the key events of the 1900-1913 period. 
International and Domestic Overview 
In the period 1899-1914 the international economy was characterized by ex- 
treme financial and monetary liquidity in international  markets due to a sus- 
tained increase in the world stock of gold. This expansion reached 3.5 percent 
annually between 1890 and 1914, well above the 1.5 percent annual average 
growth between 1866  and 1890.9 Under the international gold standard system 
these growth rates produced a generalized increase in the means of payment in 
the central countries and brought about an extraordinary increase in the level of 
activity and in prices. In Great Britain in the period 1899-13, the real economy 
grew at an accumulated rate of 16.8 percent, while the price index grew at 12.3 
9. Data from Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 137). 126  Straining at the Anchor 
percent.  In the United States, the accumulated growth rates of the economy 
and of prices were 51.9 percent and 28.4 percent, respectively. 
Argentina also underwent an important period of expansion in the real sec- 
tor of the economy with the level of real output growing in 1899-1914  at an 
accumulated rate of 78.5 percent, equal to an average annual rate of 5.8 per- 
cent. In another reflection of the increase in the international stock of money, 
Argentina imported external inflationary pressures. The price level rose at an 
accumulated rate of 36.3 percent during this period, an average of 2.6 percent 
annually. Following a severe depression in prices at the beginning of the century 
(1899-1901), which brought a fall of 15 percent in price levels, the subsequent 
tendency for prices to rise reflected extraordinary improvements in the terms of 
trade for all countries that exported agricultural goods. The increase in exports 
plus the continued inflow of capital into Argentina had a strong correlation 
with the country’s real, financial, and monetary performance. 
From the point of view of monetary policy, the Conversion Office respected 
the rules of the game.  The monetary authorities lost control of the quantity 
of the monetary base, which was left to be determined endogenously by the 
domestic money market. According to the monetary approach to the balance 
of payments, movements of specie became the vehicle by which equilibrium 
was restored to the market through adjustments in the specie stock, and from 
Table 2.4 we saw that the entire increase of the monetary base from 1900 to 
1913  was exactly equal to the rise in the level of specie at the Conversion Office. 
Bank Money and Financial Deepening 
The growth of the monetary base was surpassed by that of bank money, which 
grew at an accumulated rate of 161.5 percent, or an annual rate of 12.2 percent. 
Bank money, and the money multiplier, clearly showed procyclical tendencies. 
After an accentuated fall after the Baring Crisis, the multiplier rose from a low 
of 1.2 in 1893 to a high of 2.2 in 1912.  Judged by this statistic alone, this 
recovery could not match the financial deepening achieved in the 1880s during 
the period of the Law of National Guaranteed Banks. 
Nevertheless, we feel certain that the deepening of financial intermediation 
which  occurred in the later  period was  more genuine than in  the previous 
expansive experience since, in the later case, the country’s economic agents 
made real use of bank deposits as an alternative monetary asset. In the boom of 
1889, for each “guaranteed” peso held by the public, little more than two pesos 
of commercial deposits existed.  By 1912, for each peso in the hands of the 
public, there were more than three pesos in private commercial deposits.  For 
some comparative perspective here, in the United States the ratio of deposits 
to cash was 3.4 in 1890 and 6.8 in 1910. This process of expansion of money Calm Before a Storm  127 
or bank credit can be explained by the behavior of the level of reserves in the 
financial system and the ratio of cash to deposits held by the public. 
Bank Reserves and the Risk of  Runs 
While the reserve ratio, the ratio of bank reserves to deposits, remained quite 
high in Argentina, it fell from an average of 50 percent for the decade of the 
1890s to about 30 percent in 1910. This fall in aggregate reserves explained 8 
percent of the change in the broad money supply during this period of consider- 
able economic and monetary expansion. It  is interesting to note that even when 
the Banco de la Naci6n Argentina began to play an important role in financial 
markets, the bank remained very conservative in terms of loans, maintaining 
reserve ratios as high as 62 percent in 1903 and no lower than the 31 percent 
level seen in 1912. The  private banks in Argentina had lower reserve levels with 
a maximum of 31 percent in 1901  and a minimum of24  percent in 1911. 
Given the monetary regime, such a cautious attitude toward bank reserves 
is, as we have suggested, not surprising, and we will explore this question more 
deeply in the next chapter. For now, we again stress that the system offractional- 
reserve banks functioned in the absence of a Lender of Last Resort, since neither 
the Conversion Office nor the Banco de la Nacion Argentina had the authority 
to advance rediscounted funds in the event of a massive run on the deposits of 
private banks.'" This seeming structural weakness was offset by a high level of 
reserves relative to countries whose central banks had discretionary rediscount 
policies. In fact, the reserve ratios in the Argentine financial system under the 
gold standard were three times higher than those in the United  States-even 
though the United States, prior to the creation of the Federal Reserve Bank in 
1913,  was, like Argentina, without a formal Lender of Last Resort. 
However, Argentina had virtually no mechanisms, public or private, to pre- 
vent liquidity crises, even absent a Lender of Last Resort.  In contrast, the 
United States had the clearing houses and other institutions formed to forestall 
financial panic, a system that was buttressed by the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 
1908 under which a group of highly capitalized banks formed the National 
Currency Association." No such institutions existed in the Argentine financial 
system, a structural weakness that would become evident in the crisis of 1914. 
10. See our subsequent chapter on internal and external convertibility.  In fact, the Banco de la 
Nacion Argentina did make some small rediscounts after a change to its rules circa 1904. But 
major rediscounting powers were not available until 1914, when a new emergency law was 
passed. We discuss this legal change at the end of this chapter. 
11.  These banks were authorized to rediscount the portfolio of banks suffering a run on deposits 
by the public.  Within limits, banks with problems could convert their assets into cash to 
halt any generalized run by depositors and forestall a credit crunch. Several authors maintain 
that the Aldrich-Vreeland Act provided the mechanism by which the United States avoided a 
serious financial crisis in August 1914. See Friedrnan and Schwartz (1963, pp.  170-71) and 
Timberlake (1978). 128  Straining at the Anchor 
Cash, Deposits, and Public Behavior 
How did the general public behave in the new regime?  Confidence in the 
banking system clearly recovered from the pessimistic scenario of the 1890s 
following the Baring Crisis. This is well illustrated by the evolution of cash and 
money. We noted earlier that financial deepening, measured by the increase in 
private deposits, can serve as a force to expand the monetary holdings of the 
public. The ratio of cash to money was 36 percent when the Conversion Law 
was approved in 1899. In 1901 the ratio peaked at 38 percent, and then fell 
monotonically, reaching a plateau at about 24 percent in 1911. This secular 
trend fed into the expansion of money until 1912,  the first year in which the 
economy began to feel symptoms of financial fragility. Ifwe recall that the stock 
of money can be split into base money and banking money, the growth of the 
latter explains the 55 percent of the growth in the stock of broad money in the 
economy during this period. 
Prices and the RealExchange Rate 
Strengthened by credibility, the real exchange rate appreciated relative to the 
pound sterling by 15 percent in the period 1899 to 1914. The dynamics of the 
real exchange rate in this case resemble the recent experiences  with stabilization 
in developing countries based on a fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor. Put 
another way, the inflow of capital to the Argentine economy implied an increase 
in the quantity of base money and, as a result, in the quantity of broad money- 
where the increase in the level of bank money was 60 percent over and above the 
change in the monetary base. This monetary expansion produced an increase 
in aggregate demand and domestic prices started to rise more rapidly than the 
level of international inflation. 
The sustained price boom was reflected in many indicators.  One example 
is  a crude index of real estate prices based on the price per square meter of 
residential properties in the city of Buenos Aires.”  The index shows a clear 
cyclical evolution: first, a real estate boom in 1887-90 with an increase of 210 
percent in prices; a major depression in 1890-94 with a fall of 50 percent; a 
stagnation in 1895-1903; and finally a large increase of more than 350 percent 
under the gold standard from 1904  to 1913. The  sensitivity of these asset prices 
to international movements of capital can be seen clearly during the financial 
crisis of 1914,  with a fall of 33 percent in a single year.I3 
12. While clearly imperfect, the index is a useful proxy for the evolution of nontradable goods 
prices. Given the significant international mobility of labor during this period, an index of real 
estate prices is perhaps a better proxy for aggregate demand than, say, nominal salaries. 
13. On this unpublished price index, see della Paolera (199913).  The primary source was the 
Anuario Estudistico de  la Ciudud de  Buenos Ares (Annual Report of Statistics for the City of 
Buenos Aires), which provides detailed information in 14 parishes on the number, size, and 
prices of properties sold. The index weights each parish according to sales. Calm Before a Storm  129 
Summary: The Pros and Cons of  the Gold Standard 
On  the eve of the First World War, few observers would have grumbled at the 
economic performance achieved by Argentina over the preceding decade. By 
1912 most macroeconomic indicators were at their best-ever levels. Monetary 
circulation had backing in specie of 63 percent. Country risk measured by the 
bond spread between domestic and international fixed income assets was as low 
as 1.5 percent. A steady increase in the real quantity of money continued at a 
rate of 7 percent per annum. The federal budget deficit was no higher than 20 
percent of fiscal revenues.  The ratio of public debt to national output was as 
low as 35 percent, having been more than 100  percent in 1891. 
Argentina' s potential for such a dynamic upswing was recognized by Alec 
Ford. He  emphasized the importance of the international economic cycle on the 
economy of a peripheral country that had credibly adopted the gold standard. 
In his view, the gold standard maximized an economy's ability to attract inter- 
national investors in periods of international bonanza. However, by symmetry, 
simultaneously Argentina had to face the key weakness of this kind of regime. 
For Great Britain, perhaps, the adoption of the gold standard mitigated the 
consequences of unfavorable external shocks; but for emerging market coun- 
tries like Argentina, the convertibility system left the economy very sensitive to 
sudden shocks in the country's terms of trade or in international interest rates. 
Ford's vision was thus of a gold standard that amplified economic cycles: 
It is easy to understand the dislike of some Argentines for a system which dictated 
that a slump must be aggravated by  monetary reactions, although, doubtless, they had 
forgotten that the same system served to enhance 
In truth, many Argentines were aware of both the upside and the downside. 
In 1909, not long after the United States recovered from a menacing financial 
crisis in 1907,  Silvio Gesell again put his finger on a key issue. In his work La 
pltftora monetaria de  2909 y la anemia  monetaria de 2898 (Monetary Plethora 
in 1909 and Monetary Anemia in 1898) he sounded a note of caution that 
might have seemed out of place as capital inflows surged during Argentina's 
great boom: 
Our money is so intimately and solidly linked to gold, as the pound sterling is and even 
more so than the franc and the mark.. .  .  If, in some faroff country with a gold standard, 
a crisis develops, this crisis will have immediate repercussions for the Argentine paper 
currency.. .  . And it should be that way, as  that is  what the Law of Conversion is all 
about.  He that enjoys the advantages of an international money must also accept its 
inconveniences, the pros and the cons of monetary ~olidarity.'~ 
Still, one might imagine that few were listening to Gesell's warning at a time of 
unprecedented growth and prosperity. In the Argentine economy, exuberance, 
14. Ford (1962, p. 188). 
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rational and otherwise, was at all time high. Taking all these factors into con- 
sideration, it is likely that the inhabitants of Argentina were not at all prepared 
for the severe foreign-exchange and financial crisis-a  “twin crisis’’-that  was 
about to hit the country in 1914. 
The Foreign Exchange and Financial Crisis of 1914 
The  First World War was a tremendous negative external shock to an economy 
as open as Argentina’s. It  maintained fluid international economic relationships 
with both sides of the conflict, but it was financially tied to the pound sterling. 
Eventually the conflict would end, but by then it would have destroyed the 
harmony of the international monetary system based on the gold standard, 
the very regime that Argentina had fought so hard to credibly join. With the 
exception of the United States, core countries had decided by mid-1914 to let 
the value of their monies depreciate relative to gold, and Argentina had little 
choice but to join them by abandoning convertibility in August 1914.16 
Warning  Signs 
Even as early as the beginning of 1913,  contractionary financial and monetary 
policies adopted in London started to have a strong effect on the Argentine 
domestic economy.  The Bank of England raised its discount rate from 3.4 
percent in 1912 to 5 percent by late 1913. 
By dint of the close arbitrage linkages of purchasing power parity and interest 
parity, such shocks were rapidly transmitted to domestic markets, and the figures 
in Table 6.3 allow us to see some of the impacts. The seemingly unstoppable 
increase in the domestic monetary base that had been witnessed for over  a 
decade was swiftly halted. Then, for the first time since the implementation of 
the convertibility law, a reverse in specie flows caused a reduction in the money 
supply of 4.8 percent.  A 6.4 percent  decline in bank deposits at the same 
moment reflected the spillover of these effects into the broad money market. 
These were early, yet clear indications that Argentina was about to import 
deflationary pressures from Europe. In 1913,  the annual rate of price inflation 
slowed from 2.6 percent to 0.2 percent, and the growth rate of the economy 
slowed to a discouraging 1.0 percent.  Bankruptcies increased by 20 percent 
relative to 1912, and, as we  have already mentioned, there was  a 33 percent 
drop in residential real estate values in the city of Buenos Aires in one year. 
The sudden cyclical deterioration in a very broad group of economic and 
financial indicators-including  the values of real estate and farm land, the scale 
16. The  United States imposed restrictions on the export ofspecie during 1917-19, but maintained 
the convertibility of dollars to gold within its borders.  In June 1919, the free movement of 
capital was reestablished (Bordo and Kydland 1992, pp. 22-24). Calm Before a Storm  131 
Table 6.3. Financial Crisis Indicators, 1913-14 
Year  1912  1913  1914  1915 
Monetary Base, Percentage Change  10.7  2.9  -2.4  23.0 
Gold Backing of Monetary Base, Percent  71.8  72.6  66.3  72.5 
Money Supply, Percentage Change  9.3  -5.3  -9.5  16.0 
Banking Money, Percentage Change  8.2  -11.7  -16.3  8.0 
Bank Reserves, All Banks, Percent  28.6  32.4  33.8  42.2 
Bank Reserves, Bank of London, Percent  30.6  34.0  Feb.  46.0  Jan.  68.5 
Bank Deposits, Percentage Change  8.1  -6.9  -14.2  23.4 
Wholesale Prices, Percentage Change  2.0  0.2  1.2  6.0 
Apr.  53.0 
Commercial Bankruptices, Percentage Change  -  20  Annual  175  - 
Real Output, Percentage Change  8.0  1.0  -11.0  1.0 
Ju1.-Dec.  232 
Exchange Rate, Paper Pesos per Gold Peso  2.27  2.27  2.27  2.31 
Notes and sources:  See Appendix 1. 
of bankruptcies, and the volume of deposits-gave  only a hint of the difficulties 
that the financial system was to face as the deflation threat developed.  In a 
deflationary scenario, leveraged financial entities are in grave danger.  There 
is a marked change in the relative values of banks’ assets and liabilities.  In a 
deflation, economic agents look for liquidity. This entails an increase in the 
use of cash versus deposits (bank liabilities) and a decrease in the propensity to 
hold illiquid assets (assets that normally form a part of banks’ portfolios). This 
portfolio shift implied a general deterioration in the indicators of liquidity and 
solvency of the financial system. 
Another microeconomic ratio we must keep in mind when considering a 
deleterious external shock to an open economy is the relationship between the 
monetary liabilities and the reserves in specie, that is, the ratio between inside 
money and outside money.  At the start of 1912 the ratio of specie reserves 
to broad money was 29 percent; that is, the quantity of domestic money was 
roughly three times the specie at the Conversion Office. This ratio is, of course, 
a function of two other ratios in the monetary system: the ratio of monetary 
base to reserves in specie, an indicator of the solvency of the Conversion Office 
in terms of being able to maintain the external convertibility of the peso; and 
the ratio of broad money supply to the monetary base, the money multiplier, 
which reflects the existence of a financial system with fractional reserves. 
The  banks create secondary money, or bank money, by means of the deposits 
they hold.  The inherent instability of fractional reserves arises because the 
general public may believe that a peso in the pocket is better than one on deposit. 
A contraction in the money multiplier follows, which reduces the quantity of 
money in the economy. The economy moves from deflation to financial crisis 
when the public begins to panic, or run, by trying to convert all its deposits into Cartoon 6.1. En  Europa, la tierra de Perogrullo, a la mano cerrada re llama pufio, y en la Argentina, a 
lo mano cerrada se llama ruina. (In Europe, the land of platitudes, the closed hand is calledfist, and 
in Argentina the closed hand is called ruin.) 
Notes: This cartoon conveys a flavor of the international transmission of the 1913 economic crisis. 
In emerging markets it is the financial market that delivers the blow, then as now. The  fist carries 
the label cridito (credit).  Abandoned factories rot in the background as unpaid bills lie on the 
ground. 
Source: PB7: no. 455, August 16, 1913. Calm Before a Storm  133 
pesos. With bank reserves only a fraction of total deposits, the intervention of 
a monetary authority is needed to provide the liquidity necessary to preserve 
the stability of the financial system. 
Unfortunately, given the institutional context, Lender-of-Last-Resort  ac- 
tions were explicitly not a responsibility of the Conversion Office, or anybody 
else. Thus, in the 1913 scenario it is easy for us to see, once again, the trade-off 
between internal convertibihty (stabilizing the domestic financial system) and 
external convertibility (maintaining the monetary standard which guarantees 
the value of the money). 
The Banking Crisis 
Argentina’s battle with these tensions reached a critical point in August 1914. 
We can take an insider’s look at the anatomy of this financial crisis by loolung at 
the minutes of the Bank of London and the River Plate, at that time perhaps the 
most important private commercial bank in the financial system.” We should 
note that this bank always maintained a more conservative policy than others. 
Toward the end of 1913, its level of aggregate reserves was 32 percent as shown 
in Table 6.3. 
In  April 1914,  the Bank of London and the River Plate increased the level of 
its reserves considerably to 53  percent, a response to an increase in the rediscount 
rate from 3 percent  to 4 percent by the Bank of England.  The bank also 
continually monitored an index of commercial bankruptcies in Buenos Aires. 
In 1913, the annual bankruptcy rate exceeded that of 1912 by more than 20 
percent; by the third quarter of 1914  bankruptcies were increasing at an annual 
rate of 175  percent, and by232 percent in the final quarter, as shown inTable 6.3. 
A severe downturn in real activity was underway. 
Such statistics were “leading indicators” of real activity, and clear signals of 
the financial situation of firms seeking credit.  This information was public, 
since it was regularly published by the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange (Bolsa 
de Comercio).  So it was possible, therefore, for economic agents to infer the 
change in the quality of the portfolio of the consolidated banking system. In 
a deflation, the fall in the quality of bank assets could trigger a run by creating 
negative expectations as to the future solidity of the financial system. 
From Table 6.3 we see that in 1914  Argentina’s financial system had a level of 
fractional reserves equivalent to 34 percent. For comparison, the United States 
had a reserve ratio of 12 percent, and none of the European countries had a 
ratio in excess of 5 percent. Argentina also had a more accentuated preference 
for liquidity. The ratio of cash to money in the public’s hands was almost 23 
percent. By contrast, in the United States the proportion was 13  percent. 
17. The primary source is the BOLSA (Bank of London and South America) archive, University 
College Library, London. See especially folios 192-95,199-205,  and 286 from 1914. 134  Straining at  the Anchor 
On the face of it, the Argentine financial system seemed, according to these 
indicators, to be better prepared to face a situation of illiquidity.  In the early 
days of August 1914, however, a run on deposits of unexpected dimensions 
occurred. 
Policy Response 
The major institutions in the banking system, under the leadership of the Pres- 
ident of the Banco de la Nacion Argentina, pressured the government to call 
a bank and foreign exchange holiday for one week.  The banks hoped that a 
cooling-off period would put a stop to the panic and avoid a suspension of pay- 
ments by several commercial banks.I8 The government acceded to the request, 
and, during the week of August 3, a variety of proposals were presented for 
resolving the crisis. 
The  presidents of the most important banks met daily, and on August 4 they 
presented a proposal which suggested that the government make a transitory 
emergency issue of currency to enable the Banco de la Nacion Argentina to 
rediscount or make guaranteed advances to the banks. This proposal was put 
into effect.  So too was a proposal to suspend withdrawals of specie from the 
Conversion Office and the banks. 
Still, political agreement on these plans was not complete.  In the minutes 
the Bank of London and the kver Plate commented that the Executive op- 
posed the idea of an emergency issue, and instead favored using the Conversion 
Fund @ondo de conversibn) of 30 million gold pesos as a way to rediscount the 
commercial paper of banks with problems. At first, Congress approved a Pres- 
idential decree declaring a moratorium of 30 days on all financial obligations 
falling due during that period and established that banks must respond with up 
to 20 percent of the deposits that were to fall due. The  Banco de la Nacion was 
authorized to convert the Conversion Fund to paper and to use these funds to 
rediscount commercial obligations. 
In the end, the use of emergency issues of currency was approved, despite the 
opposition of the Executive Branch.  However, as a safeguard it was required 
that money in circulation could never have a backing in specie of less than 40 
percent (at the moment the lawpassed, 72 percent ofthe  money base was backed 
in specie). The  new laws therefore offered the possibility of an expansion of the 
money supply that was more elastic in response to external ~hocks.’~ 
18. The  run on the banks also put pressure on the Bank of London and the River Plate, which had 
one of the highest reserve levels in the entire system. They reported that “in the face of such 
unusual circumstances we could not insist that our financial position was such as to withstand 
all the demands that could be made upon us and we accordingly joined our colleagues in the 
suggestion above [the request for a bank holiday]” (BOLSA, folio 193). 
19. The  emergency issue was also to be used for rediscounting commercial paper, but only with the 
consent of the Executive Branch. Calm Before a Storm  135 
Cartoon 6.2. Los cirujanos socialistas. -  iQuP estdn usteder  hacienda? -  La direccion. -  Pues 
cualquiera diria gue estabanpicando carnepara hacer embutidos.  (The socialist surgeons. [Person] - 
What are you doing? [The socialists] -The  dissection.  [Person] -  Because anyone would say 
that you are grinding meat to make cold cuts.) 
Notes:  The 1913 economic crisis has hit.  The socialist leaders attempting to impose fiscal con- 
servatism on the national budget are (left to right) Nicolis Repetto, Juan B. Justo, and Alfredo 
Palacios. These were the first three members of the socialist party to become diputados  (deputies, 
members of the lower house in Congress). The  cartoon shows that in their desire to cut the budget 
they are dismantling it to see what is inside. 
Source: PB7: aAo  10, no. 444, May 31, 1913. 
The emergency laws gave Argentina powerful Lender-of-Last-Resort  capa- 
bilities, but to a large extent they went unused.  The tools were there, but, at 
least at the Conversion Office, the authorities were reluctant to use them. The 
currency board felt it would risk its credibility if it broke the gold standard “rules 
of the game” and issued unbacked money. This was true even as many central 
banks in the core countries were breaking the same “rules”  left and right. If the 
Conversion Office was unwilling to use its emergency powers to make transitory 
issues-and  if, as seems to have been the case, it had sufficient independence to 
refrain from doing so given the political pressures-then  everything depended 
on the actions of the largest of the banks, the Banco de la Nacion Argentina. 
It is interesting to note that the government confronted the financial crisis 
by authorizing the Banco de la Nacion Argentina to use two thirds of the 30 
million gold pesos in the Conversion Fund to resolve transitory illiquidity at 
banks. In  this way, the Banco de la Nacion Argentina acted in a limited way as a 
Lender ofLast Resort. In  1914  the money supply declined 9.5 percent, deposits 
14.2 percent, and bank money 16.3 percent. Yet, despite substantial exchange 
controls prohibiting the exportation of specie, the exchange rate depreciated 
less than 2 percent in 1915. This minor adjustment suggests that the country’s 
economic agents felt that any suspension in convertibility  was clearly contingent 
on international events. After this crisis, the recuperation of the financial system 
was a rapid one, though real output did not recover until 1916. 136  Straining at  the Anchor 
The  End  of the Golden Age 
For almost fifteen years, the convertibility law of 1899 had provided a sound 
basis for the macroeconomic policies of the Argentine  Republic in the first 
era of economic globalization.  Policymakers realized that, while they were 
constrained by open economy forces, they could still benefit from “network 
externalities” in a world enamored of gold standard rules and could use a cred- 
ible commitment mechanism to overcome a doubtful reputation for fiscal and 
monetary responsibility. 
Unfortunately for the country, most of the features that made the currency 
board regime so suitable for the Golden Age from 1900 until 1914, also made 
the system very risky for use in the turbulent interwar period that followed. This 
was not, of course, Argentina’s fault; the outbreak of war was surely exogenous 
to the country.  But the change of scene amply illustrated that large external 
shocks can quite radically alter the calculation as to what constitutes an optimal 
monetary, banking, and exchange-rate regime. 
The immediate shock of the 1914  crisis was undoubtedly large, and a deep 
recession followed that cost Argentina  a massive cumulative loss of output. 
However, even after a recovery from this downturn, the problems of macroeco- 
nomic and financial instability in the economy were far from solved. The next 
part of the book traces the subsequent gradual breakdown of the gold standard 
in Argentina in the interwar period. We  argue that one must view this unfold- 
ing drama at several levels to fully understand the tensions unleashed by the 
radical external regime change in 1914. 
At a microeconomic level, the banking system had to cope with new shocks, 
a lack of insurance, and no real Lender-of-Last-Resort  capabilities. Yet, at the 
same time, it faced a marked increase in the demand for capital and interme- 
diation after the retreat of foreign banks and investors. At a regulatory level, 
the Banco de la Nacion asserted itself more forcefully as a “quasi” Lender of 
Last Resort, and, by venturing beyond what its own rules permitted, it helped 
keep a troubled banking system alive. At  a macroeconomic level, larger external 
shocks rattled the economy, and the Conversion Office could do little but fol- 
low its prescribed mechanical functions, since it chose to play by its own rules. 
Finally, the inconsistencies in the whole framework were exposed by the world 
depression of the 1930s, and the threat of failure in both internal and external 
convertibility would eventually destroy the entire system. 